Abstract
How do beliefs about race, class, and health behaviors affect health policy opinions? Analysis of vignette experiments embedded in a nationally representative survey shows that cues about the behavior of sick individuals exert a more powerful effect on health policy opinions than do explicit racial or class group cues, which in American policy discourse are more traditional signals of group deservingness. Attributing health status to personal behaviors is associated with increased support for individual versus societal responsibility for health care costs, and lower public support for government-financed health insurance. However, Americans differ in their attribution of health disparities to behaviors (versus biological or systemic factors) depending on whether groups are defined in racial, class, or gender terms. Because causal attributions also affect health policy opinions, varying patterns of attribution may reinforce harmful group stereotypes and undermine support for universal access to health care.
Attitudes about social groups are important determinants of Americans' opinions about public policy matters (Sniderman 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Kam 2009 ). Simply signaling a particular social group as the beneficiary of a policy activates attitudes and stereotypes about that group when the public considers the policy issue at stake (Nelson and Kinder 1996) . Such group cues have potent effects on policy preferences in part because they simplify complex policy decisions: when the social group membership of the policy's target population is highlighted, people can draw on their beliefs about whether that group is "deserving" of policy support to inform their policy opinions (Druckman et al. 2010) . At the same time, assessments of deservingness are also influenced by cues about behavior. Group cues influence policy opinions partly because they tap into stereotypes about presumed behaviorwhether members of a group tend to be hardworking, providential, or adherent to dominant social norms (Gilens 1999; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Cook and Barrett 1992) . Thus, both cues about what people are (ascriptive group characteristics) and cues about what they do (behavioral characteristics) can influence policy opinions because they tell us whether the beneficiaries of a policy are likely to be deserving. This paper examines how ascriptive and behavioral cues influence beliefs about who deserves society's assistance in paying for the costs of health care.
While decades of research in the social sciences confirm the influence of group cues (i.e., social group membership) on policy opinions, we know less about how direct behavioral cues affect public opinion about social policies. Yet causal attributions are a key component of perceptions of deservingness, which influence the social policy agenda in the U.S. in powerful ways (Cook and Barrett 1992) . Within the domain of health policy, government health insurance programs were historically targeted for groups constructed to be deserving, like the elderly and pregnant women (Grogan and Patashnik 2005; Cook and Barrett 1992) , and public health policy has long focused on regulating, monitoring, and making people accountable for behaviors considered non-normative, or even "sinful" (Leichter 2003; Morone 2003) . Contemporary discourse surrounding health care reform continues to reflect the notion that patients should be held accountable for their unhealthy behaviors (Schmidt, Voigt, and Wikler 2010) . The 2010 health reform legislation, for example, offers incentives for employers to implement worksite wellness programs that target support services, premium discounts, and/or financial penalties to individuals based on their health behaviors. Moreover, media coverage emphasizes the financial costs to society of behaviors like unhealthy eating, failure to exercise, and smoking, and the idea that sick individuals should be held financially responsible for their costly behaviors has great traction in policy discourse (Brownell et al. 2010; Kersh 2009 ).
Do the behavioral cues contained in such messages influence the public's beliefs about who should bear the burden of health care costs? And how do these behavioral cues interact with more traditional group cues, the race or socioeconomic status of likely beneficiaries? In this paper, we assess the consequences for health policy preferences of both behavioral and ascriptive cues, independently and in interaction. 2 We use Druckman et al.'s definition of a cue as "a piece of information" that "enable [s] individuals to make simplified evaluations without analyzing extensive information" (2010, p.137) .
The data come from three experimental vignettes embedded in a nationally representative survey of American adults. We find that behavioral indicators of deservingness are more powerful than ascriptive group cues (racial or class-related signals) in predicting opinions about the appropriate role for individuals versus society in paying for health care. Yet the degree to which respondents attribute group differences in health to behavioral factors varies by the ascriptive characteristics of that group (i.e., gender, race, income, or educational attainment). When people perceive that group differences in health status are due to individuals' behaviors, they are more likely also to believe that individuals, not the government, should be responsible for the costs of medical care.
Group-related Sentiment and Deservingness
An extensive literature describes the robust influence of concepts of deservingness on the politics of American social policy. Skocpol (1992) remarks, for instance, that "institutional and cultural oppositions between the morally 'deserving' and the less deserving run like fault lines through the entire history of American social provision" (p. 151). Cook and Barrett (1992) articulate five criteria by which of the public and policymakers define a policy target's deservingness: 1) the level and extent of that beneficiary's need; 2) whether alternative sources of help exist; 3) the cause (or perceived cause) of the needs; 4) whether the individual strives toward independence and self-sufficiency; and 5) whether or not recipients use their benefits in a prudent manner. The overarching concept of deservingness, then, helps to explain why prior social science research has found that both group-related attitudes and perceptions of causal attributions influence policy-relevant opinion.
For the former, group-related attitudes, abundant research has established that attitudes and stereotypes about groups influence the public's judgments about policy support (see, e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996) . Much of this research on the effects of group attitudes on policy opinion in the United States has tended to focus on the influence of negative stereotypes about African Americans and race-related policy opinion, perhaps given the centrality of racial politics to U.S. social policy (Hutchings and Valentino 2004) . This literature contends that racialized stereotypes about normative behavior (i.e., providential and self-sufficient versus lazy) explain why racial group signals influence the public's support for social policy (Gilens 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman1997) . While a spirited debate persists in the literature as to how to label and characterize these associations (e.g., as racial resentment, modern racism, symbolic racism, etc), and how to overcome the methodological challenges of measuring racism in an era of increasing hesitance to express overtly racist sentiments, scholars agree that racial attitudes matter a great deal to Americans' opinions on social policy issues (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Berinsky 2002; Krysan 2000) .
In contrast to the body of work on racial group attitudes and policy opinion, there has been less research into how attitudes about groups defined by social class intersect with perceptions of deservingness and support for social policies (Weeks and Lupfer 2004) . Of course, racial and class stereotypes often overlap -for example, as poor welfare recipients have become progressively defined as African American, they have accordingly become attached to negative racial stereotypes (Gilens 1999; Weeks and Lupfer 2004) . But when social spending is framed as redressing class inequalities as opposed to racial inequalities, support among white Americans for such spending tends to increase (Kinder and Sanders 1996) , suggesting class group cues can have distinct effects. Indeed, drawing from Cook and Barrett's (1992) schema, beliefs about the level of beneficiary need should influence perceptions of deservingness. Most of the existing literature on the impact of class cues on policy opinion focuses on the influence on policy opinions of attitudes toward the poor, the unemployed, or welfare recipients rather than the working class (Gilens 1999; Stuber and Schlesinger 2006; Weeks and Lupfer 2004) , but the working class (as we describe below) figures importantly as a deserving group in health policy discourse.
While previous research has demonstrated that racial group cues can affect opinion even in policy domains that are not explicitly about redressing racial inequalities (e.g, evaluations of political candidates, policy opinion toward crime, Social Security) (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Winter 2006) , little research has addressed the influence of group attitudes, whether racial or class-related, in the health policy domain. Yet both types of group-related attitudes could meaningfully influence health policy opinions, given the centrality of race and class in health policy discourse.
Racial disparities in health and health care have held an important position on the health policy agenda for decades, albeit intermittently (Stone 2006) , and the overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities among the beneficiaries of government health programs like Medicaid suggests race ought to be a salient factor underlying public support for such programs (Schlesinger and Lee 1993) . Still, in their comprehensive review of public opinion studies regarding health policy, Schlesinger and Lee (1993) note that "Virtually nothing is known about the racial identification of health programs by the general public" (p. 583). The few existing survey-experimental studies that assess the associations between racial group cues and respondents' preferences toward health resource allocation have found limited effects of the former on the latter (Gollust, Lantz, and Ubel 2010; Lenton, Blair, and Hastie 2006; MurphyBerman, Berman, and Campbell 1998) . It seems likely that, as is true in other policy domains (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002) , explicit racial group cues trigger a social desirability response bias that prevents survey respondents from advocating less social support for health care when the beneficiaries are explicitly described as non-white.
As for social class-related cues, political rhetoric surrounding health insurance reform abounds with expressions of concern about the affordability of health care and the security of benefits for working-class Americans (Jerit 2008) . The working class is defined as deserving in these debates because of workers' legitimate need for assistance to make their health insurance benefits more affordable and secure. For instance, in his address to Congress in September 2009, President Obama emphasized the needs of the providential and hard-working, as distinguished from welfare recipients: "These are not primarily people on welfare. These are middle-class Americans. Some can't get insurance on the job. Others are self-employed, and can't afford it, since buying insurance on your own costs you three times as much as the coverage you get from your employer. Many other Americans who are willing and able to pay are still denied insurance due to previous illnesses or conditions that insurance companies decide are too risky or expensive to cover." This emphasis in public discourse on the legitimacy of the needs of the working class are reflected in public opinion, as Americans in 2010 expressed high levels of concern about the affordability of their care and the possibility of losing coverage (Brodie et al. 2010 ). Thus, one would expect considerations about the economic status of beneficiaries to be salient when Americans form opinions about health insurance expansions. Yet there has been no study, to our knowledge, that assesses how the perceived social class identity of beneficiaries affects public interest in devoting public or private resources to help with health care costs.
Causal Attributions and Deservingness
Like attitudes toward social groups, causal attributions play an important role in explaining policy judgments, among the public and policymakers alike (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Stone 1989) . The cause of a beneficiary's need for social policy support, that is, whether or not they are at fault for their situation, is a major influence on perceptions of deservingness (Cook and Barrett 1992) . Generally speaking, the public's perceptions of what causes a social problem-particularly whether the cause is internal or external to the individual and how controllable the cause is perceived to be-influence judgments about who is responsible for causing, and for treating, the problem (Weiner 2006; Jayaratne et al. 2009; Iyengar 1991) .
In contrast to the paucity of empirical research in the health policy domain assessing the influence of ascriptive group cues, abundant research demonstrates that cues about the causes of ill health affect a variety of social and policy responses. Causal attributions for health outcomes include behavioral factors (like poor diet or smoking, which imply some level of voluntary control), biological factors (which are generally under the control of neither the individual nor society at large), systemic factors (not under the control of the individual, but related to social structural features like discrimination or the functioning of the health care system), and other impersonal factors like bad luck or fate. Consistent with research on non-health-related social inequality (Kluegel and Smith 1986) , survey and experimental research has found that in the health domain, people have more sympathy and are more willing to support governmental action when they believe that systemic or environmental factors, rather than individual behaviors or personal responsibility, are the cause of some health problem or inequality (Barry et al. 2009; Oliver and Lee 2005; Reutter, Harrison, and Neufeld 2002; Lenton et al. 2006; Murphy-Berman et al. 1998; Ubel, Baron, and Asch 1999) . With rare exceptions (Lenton et al. 2006; MurphyBerman et al 1998) , these studies in the health domain have not simultaneously evaluated how social group cues interact with behavioral cues, even though we know that both have a strong theoretical relationship to deservingness.
These studies showing less willingness to help those who bear personal responsibility for their illnesses suggest an important role for blame. Blame occurs when a normatively neutral belief about the cause of a health condition (the causal attribution) is transformed into a moral failing on the part of the affected person. As a social response, blame combines cognition (a judgment of responsibility) and affect (anger), which both mediate the effect of a causal attribution on a policy judgment (Weiner 1993) . Unlike some previous scholarship that conceptually elides the causal attribution and the assessment of blame (see, e.g., Lenton et al. 2006 ), we consider blame to be an intervening step in the process that links causal attributions on the one hand to judgments of policy responsibility (or "treatment responsibility" [Iyengar 1991 ]), on the other.
Research Aims and Hypotheses
The goal of this study is to assess how explicit cues about race, social class, and health behaviors affect the public's propensity to blame the ill, and their attribution of the responsibility for "treating" health policy problems to the individual versus society as a whole. By experimentally manipulating both ascriptive and behavioral cues, we can measure their causal impact on attitudinal and policy preference outcomes. The literature reviewed above informs our empirical expectations.
We expect explicit information about both ascriptive characteristics and the causes of illness to affect respondents' assessment of blame and treatment responsibility. When a sick individual is portrayed as being causally responsible for his illness, we expect that this cue will elicit more blame and thus less social support for his medical care than when the behavioral cue is absent. We extend this hypothesis to the level of groups: when group health differences are attributed to behavioral choices, we expect the public to be less supportive of a government role in providing universal health insurance. Depicting a sick individual as a member of the working class, a group framed sympathetically in health policy rhetoric, should elicit less blame and more policy support than a depiction of a higher-earning sick individual, because of his identified need for help. Given the explicit nature of the text-based racial group cue and strong public norms against reporting equality-violating sentiment (e.g., Mendelberg 2001), we expect that cueing a sick individual's race as African American (compared to white) is unlikely, on average, to exert an independent effect on either blame or policy support.
The effects of causal attributions and group cues are likely to be particularly closely intertwined in the health domain. In an epidemiological context in which racial minorities and people of lower SES are disproportionately likely to smoke and to be overweight (Lantz et al. 1998) , and a media environment in which behavioral causes of illness and of racial differences in health are emphasized (Kim et al. 2010; Saguy and Gruys 2010) , we expect to observe an interactive effect of causal attributions and group cues on beliefs about blame and policy deservingness. In particular, equality norms may prevent whites from endorsing the view that blacks are more to blame for their ill health and should be more responsible for the costs of medical care. But when a black individual is shown to engage in unhealthy behaviors, the expression that he is undeserving may be more socially acceptable, by providing an excuse that he is causally responsible for his poor health (Lenton et al. 2006; Murphy-Berman et al. 1998) .
A similar interactive effect could occur when pairing class cues and behaviors: greater sympathy toward a working-class individual (relative to someone of higher social class) would only appear when that individual is otherwise wholly deserving -i.e., not causally responsible for his illness.
Finally, we hypothesize that causal attributions and ascriptive group cues will also interact at another conceptual juncture: group-based sentiment will influence public beliefs about the causes of group differences in ill health. Since members of the public rely so strongly on perceptions of social groups in coming to a variety of social judgments (Nelson and Kinder 1996) , group cues are likely to influence the public's own causal explanations for why health differs across group (Rigby et al. 2009 ), just as causal attributions for other types of group differences (socioeconomic inequality, intelligence, sexual orientation) have been shown to differ depending on the group in question (Jayaratne et al. 2009; Kluegel 1990 ).
By using three discrete experimental designs and randomly assigning the causal attributions and/or group cues, this study allows us to test the causal impact of these factors on health policy judgments in two controlled ways: First, we test whether ascriptive group cues influence policy opinion, both independently and in interaction with experimentally-induced causal attributions. Second, we test whether group cues affect causal attributions for health inequalities, and ultimately public preferences for governmental support for health insurance.
Survey and Methods
Data in this study come from an original nationally representative, Internet-based survey of American adults fielded by the survey firm Knowledge Networks between August 22 and September 13, 2007. Knowledge Networks maintains a panel of about 50,000 potential study participants, recruited using random-digit dialing so as to be representative of the national U.S. population. The survey was administered in two waves, separated by two weeks, in order to minimize respondent fatigue (each half took a median of 15-16 minutes to complete) and crosscontamination between experimental treatments in the two halves of the survey. The first two vignettes described below were administered in Wave 1. The third occurred near the beginning of the Wave 2 survey instrument. We describe the vignettes in more detail below, with the complete text of the vignettes and questions appearing in Appendix A. The completion rate for this survey was 72.6% in Wave 1 and 79.7% in Wave 2 (higher than the average survey completion rate of 65% among Knowledge Network panelists at this time). The total sample size of respondents who completed wave 1 was 1,676 and the total sample size of respondents who completed both waves was 1,334 (with fewer respondents assigned to certain experimental vignettes, based on study design; see below).
Embedded within the survey were three experimental vignettes concerning health and health care. In the first two vignettes, we experimentally manipulated whether a hypothetical man (Chuck or Ralph) suffering from diabetes or heart disease engaged in unhealthy behaviors (smoking or poor diet) or whether he had a family history of the disease. At the same time, we manipulated either his race (African American versus white) or SES (working class or middle class). Thus, each of these two experiments used a 2 x 2 design, varying the ascriptive group cue (group status) and the behavioral cue (engaged in unhealthy behavior or not) present in each. The main outcomes were respondents' attribution of blame to the individual described in the vignette (measured on a 10-point scale with endpoints labeled "[Name of protagonist] is completely to blame" (1) and "[Name of protagonist] is not at all to blame (10); and who, in a fair society, should be the one to pay for the costs of the man's medical care: "[Name of protagonist] should pay all costs" (1) and "Citizens in society should pay all costs" (10). 4 In Experiment 3, we presented respondents with text about inequalities in life expectancy between two social groups (e.g., African Americans versus whites, low-income versus mediumincome Americans), randomly assigning the type of social group described in the scenario (i.e., gender, race, income, education).
5
Analyses of the first two experiments consisted of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the outcome variables (blame and opinion about who should pay for medical care) on dummy variables for the treatments (group cue and causal cue), independently and in interaction. To test whether respondent characteristics (respondents' own race or social class) affected their response to the vignettes, we estimated regression models including interaction terms with respondents' race and class. Finally, to assess whether any effects of the experimental treatments on policy opinion were mediated by respondents' assignment of blame, we added blame as a covariate and estimated the corresponding Sobel statistics (Baron and Kenny 1986) .
We then measured the causes to which respondents attributed the gap in life expectancy under these four scenarios, asking respondents to select from a list of six explanations for these group differences. To determine whether these causal attributions might predict health policy opinions, at the conclusion of the survey we asked all respondents their preferences about the role of government in health insurance provision. The question asked: "Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan that would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals, and through private insurance plans. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" The response scale ranged from 1= 'Individuals and private insurance' to 7= 'Government insurance plan.'
5 The randomization of treatments in Experiment 3 was successful on all of the demographic and health-related criteria in note 2 above, except that respondents assigned to the race condition were slightly more likely than those assigned to the other conditions to have been uninsured at some point in the last three years. We control for uninsurance history in all regression models.
Statistical analysis for the third experiment consisted of chi-square analyses to assess whether respondents' causal attributions for group differences in mortality varied by the type of group difference to which they were randomly assigned. Next, we estimated multinomial logit models to determine whether the group cue and/or respondent characteristics were associated with the respondents' choice of causal attribution. Finally, to determine whether these causal attributions predicted policy preferences, we estimated OLS regression models of policy preference (the government health insurance provision question described above) on the randomly assigned group, respondents' causal attributions, and characteristics of respondents.
All analyses in this paper were performed using Stata 10.1, and used the survey weights provided by Knowledge Networks to adjust the results to be representative of the national U.S. population.
Results

Experiment 1: The effects of racial and behavioral cues on blame and support for societal assistance with health care costs
The first experiment presented survey respondents with information about a fictitious man with heart disease who is unable to pay the bills for his treatment because he has no insurance. The vignette states that "Ralph" is forty years old, employed full time, and uninsured because his employer does not provide health insurance and he is unable to afford to purchase insurance himself. Respondents (N=1,342) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on joint manipulation of Ralph's race (African American or white) and the likely cause of Ralph's illness (behavioral -"He smokes and has heart disease" -or biological --"He has heart disease, as did his father) (n=~330 per condition). First, we evaluated the impact of causal and group cues by estimating regression models of respondents' assignment of blame on variables representing Ralph's race (1=African-American, 0=white) and the implied cause of his illness (1=behavioral, 0=family history) ( Table   1 , Model 1). The random assignment of respondents to these experimental conditions allows us to produce unbiased estimates of the effects of these variables without including covariates indicating respondent characteristics.
6 In a second model, we added an interaction term between the causal cue and the race cue to evaluate whether there is an interactive effect of the two types of cues ( Respondents rate Ralph 2.73 units more blameworthy on the ten-point blame scale when they are told that he smokes, compared to when the vignette states that he has a family history of disease.
In contrast, the model shows no significant effect of the racial group cue on how much respondents blame Ralph for his illness, nor does it show a statistically significant interactive effect of the causal cue and the group cue (Model 2). However, the effect of the racial group cue 6 Introducing a full battery of demographic and attitudinal controls (available on request) does not substantively affect the results. or white (M=5.17, t=0.10, p=0.92).
The fourth through seventh columns of results in Table 1 show coefficients from regression models predicting respondents' allocation of treatment responsibility -i.e., whether society at large (lower values) or Ralph himself (higher values) should be responsible for the costs of Ralph's medical care. While the effect of the behavioral causal cue is smaller than in the models predicting blame, respondents also assign significantly more treatment responsibility to Ralph when they are told that he engages in the proscribed behavior (smoking) than when he has a family history of heart disease. Holding Ralph's behavior constant, his race has no effect on respondents' beliefs about who should pay for his medical care costs. The lack of a significant coefficient on the interaction term in Model 5 reveals that the effect of the group cue is the same regardless of the causal cue assigned. for by respondents' propensity to blame Ralph more for his heart disease when they are told that he smokes.
Overall, the causal cues affected all respondents strongly, with the behavioral (smoking) cue generating a marked increase in propensity to assign both blame and treatment responsibility to the vignette target. Furthermore, the African American racial group cue elicited more sympathy (less blame and less attribution of treatment responsibility to Ralph) among nonwhite than white respondents. In contrast, we find minimal effects of the explicit racial cue on whites, similar to other studies in the health domain (Gollust et al. 2010; Lenton et al. 2006; MurphyBerman et al. 1998) . Our findings are consistent with research that suggests explicit racial cues have limited impact on policy opinion when the policy can be interpreted as having an egalitarian motive (Mendelberg 2000) and when the individual is depicted as hard-working and thus deserving (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . Rather than constituting proof that "race doesn't matter" in the health policy domain, though, this experiment reveals mainly that the norms that prevent many respondents from denying policy support on the basis of a recipient's race do not similarly constrain attitudes towards policies aimed at groups defined by their health behaviors.
Experiment 2: Effects of class and behavioral cues on blame and support
A parallel experiment about "Chuck" allows us to assess the effects of behavioral cues and social class, rather than racial, group cues on attitudes, in a scenario very similar to the vignette about "Ralph." As in the Ralph vignette, the Chuck vignette describes a forty year-old, full-time employed man with a chronic health problem (in this case, diabetes), no health insurance (again because it is not offered through his job and he can't afford to purchase it himself), and either a behavioral ("He eats a lot of processed foods and few vegetables and has diabetes") or a family history ("He has diabetes, as did his father") causal cue. Respondents (N=1342, ~330 per condition) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on joint manipulation of the causal cue and Chuck's social class: working class ("earning $24,000 per year working in an auto-body repair shop"), or middle class ("earning $48,000 per year working in an insurance company.") As before, respondents were asked to rate how much Chuck is to blame for his own illness; and who, in a fair society, should pay for the costs of Chuck's medical care -Chuck, or all members of society.
We analyzed the data from the Chuck vignette in a fashion directly analogous to the Ralph vignette; results are presented in Table 2 . The effect of the behavioral causal cue on blame attribution, while somewhat smaller than in the Ralph (heart disease) vignette, is nevertheless consistently large and significant, with respondents blaming Chuck almost two units more on the ten point scale when he was said to have poor diet and exercise habits than when he was said to have a family history of illness.
In this vignette, the group cue also had a significant effect on blame (Model 1). The depiction of Chuck as a full-time employed blue-collar worker seems likely to have triggered positive attitudes about deservingness associated with hard work, need for assistance, and lack of alternative sources of help to meet this need, so that Chuck is blamed less for his illness when he is portrayed as working class than when he is portrayed as middle class. We find no interaction effect of the class group cue and the causal cue (Table 2 , Model 2). We also find no significant interaction effect between the class group cue and the socioeconomic status of the respondent ( 
Experiment 3: Effects of group cues on causal attributions and policy support
In the two preceding experiments, we manipulated both vignette protagonists' ascriptive group membership (race or class) and their health behaviors. In the real world, however, people generally make their own judgments about the likely causes of health and illness-judgments that may well be influenced by prior beliefs and stereotypes surrounding race and class (Rigby et al. 2009 ). In Experiment 3 we ask what respondents perceive as the main causes of differences 8 The group cue was size-adjusted household income above or below 200% of the federal poverty level. The results are robust to alternate specifications of SES using various measures of income and educational attainment (not shown).
in health outcomes between different social groups, manipulating the groups to which the respondents are exposed. Thus, the third experiment allows us to assess whether the attribution of causal responsibility for poor health outcomes-which we have already seen strongly affects respondents' allocation of blame and treatment responsibility-is affected by cues about the group that suffers disproportionately from ill health.
Recall that this vignette presented respondents (N=1,334) with information about fiveyear gaps in average life expectancy between two social groups in society -either African
Americans as compared to white Americans; low-income versus medium-income Americans,
Americans with less than a high school education versus those who have attended college, and men versus women (~330 per condition). Following the vignette, respondents were asked to choose which of six options was, in their view, the most important reason for the five-year gap:
"just bad luck," "personal behavior" of the disadvantaged group, "prejudice and discrimination,"
"inborn characteristics (genetic or biological)," "failure of the health care system," or "failure of the economic system." Choices were presented in the same order for all respondents. There was no "don't know" option.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of respondents' choice of causal attributions for life expectancy gaps, for each group cue. The pattern of causal attributions for these life expectancy disparities differs significantly across the four experimental conditions. Respondents were more likely to choose a systemic cause (health care system failure or economic system failure) for educational or income-related disparities than for racial or gender differences, which were far more frequently attributed to inborn biological or genetic characteristics. At the same time, behavioral attributions for racial health disparities were less frequent, relative to both biological attributions for racial disparities and to behavioral attributions for non-racial disparities. Table 3 reports the results of multinomial logit regressions predicting the choice of behavioral or biological causal attributions as compared to systemic attributions (health care or economic system failure or prejudice) (with the 40 respondents who chose "luck" excluded). The effects of the group cues on causal attributions are robust to the inclusion of individual-level demographic, health-related, and ideological/partisan control variables, as the randomization into treatment groups should guarantee. Controlling for these effects, nonwhite respondents were more likely to attribute any group difference to systemic factors rather than to behaviors or to biology, while conservatives and Republicans were more likely to attribute group differences to behaviors (and biology, for conservatives) as compared to systemic factors. Healthier people were also more likely to attribute differences to behaviors.
We saw in the first two experiments that experimentally manipulated cues about the cause of illness affected the extent to which respondents blamed individuals for their own illnesses, and also predicted preferences regarding who should pay (individuals or society at large) for the costs of treating those illnesses. In the final set of analyses, we ask whether respondents' own beliefs about the cause of mortality differences are related to their preference for government versus private financing of health insurance. Table 4 shows that it is not the type of group portrayed, but rather the type of explanation that respondents provide for these group differences that is most strongly related to preferences about the role of government in health insurance. Behavioral and biological attributions are both, compared to systemic attributions, associated with support for a more limited role of government in financing health insurance (Model 2).
Naturally, ideology and partisanship and other individual characteristics are important predictors of opinion about the role of government in delivering health insurance and are also correlated (as shown in Table 3 ) with participants' causal attributions. But even after adjusting for these characteristics (Table 4 , Model 3) we observe that the reasons participants adduce to explain why some people die younger than others strongly predict how much government involvement in health insurance financing they are willing to endorse. As expected, this model also indicates that liberals, Democrats, sick people, and those who are enrolled in the government-financed Medicaid or SCHIP programs prefer a larger role for government in financing health insurance. But causal attributions --one's perceptions about the reasons for unequal health outcomes in society --have a considerable influence on public preferences for more or less government involvement in health care.
Conclusion
This study investigated the impact of cues about ascriptive (race and class) and behavioral (smoking and diet) characteristics on the formation of attitudes in the health domain.
The key finding across all three experiments is the robust and meaningful impact of behavioral causal attributions on attitudes and policy opinion. While respondents may be reluctant to express negative attitudes in response to explicit cues about racial or social class attributes, they do not hesitate to cast blame or deny social support based on equally explicit cues about groups defined by their behavioral attributes. Respondents were more likely to blame individuals and less likely to offer them societal support for their medical expenses when their illness were linked to behavioral choices. Moreover, respondents who perceived health inequalities between groups as resulting from behavioral differences were less likely to support a government role in providing health insurance.
Reactions to the three vignette experiments suggest that health policy attitudes are consistent with American philosophical traditions that emphasize deservingness deriving from exercise of personal responsibility, and also that these attitudes are tempered by considerations of need. All respondents exhibited more sympathy toward a protagonist described as workingclass, suggesting that his low income warranted him deserving of extra help with his medical expenses.
The impact of racial attitudes is more difficult to extract from these data. The explicit racial group cue induced a (preferential) response among nonwhites, but little response at all among whites. This could be due to social desirability response bias or the portrayal of the protagonist as full-time employed, thus countering the stereotype that African Americans are not hard-working (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) . Consistent with previous research, we also find that the effect of the racial group cue does not differ when interacted with a behavioral signal of undeservingness (Lenton et al. 2006; Murphy-Berman et al. 1998 ). Because our study did not include any direct measures of anti-black affect or racial resentment, we cannot assess whether the racial group cue might have affected people with predisposing negative racial attitudes differently than those with more favorable attitudes. At least one study conducted after health care reform had become linked to the Obama presidency finds that opposition to health care reform is explained in part by underlying racial resentment (Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg 2010) .
At the same time, our findings also show that Americans link causal attributions to ascriptively defined groups in systematic ways when they think about health inequalities.
Consistent with Rigby et al.'s (2009) research, our respondents indicated that certain explanations for group differences in health seem more plausible depending on the group that is affected: inborn biological or genetic factors explain gender or racial health inequalities more than they do SES-related inequalities, for instance; and health care system failures are a more likely explanation for income-related inequalities than for racial inequalities in health.
Surprisingly, in light of research demonstrating the prevalence of behavioral attributions in media depictions of racial health disparities (Kim et al. 2010) , respondents were less likely to say that African Americans' (as compared to other groups') health disadvantages were due to personal behaviors. This may be explained by the close mapping of this attribution onto socially unacceptable racist stereotypes about blacks as lazy, irresponsible, or happy-go-lucky (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997) . However, the frequent attribution of racial differences to inborn biological characteristics signals that in spite of a decline in the expression of "old-fashioned" racism that presumes the biological inferiority of African Americans (Schuman et al. 1997) , essentialized notions of racial group difference remain common among the public (Jayaratne et al. 2009 ).
A few limitations of the study design are worth noting. First, the survey was conducted over the Internet and relies upon a previously-established panel of respondents. However, Internet surveys have been found to compare favorably to telephone surveys in terms of validity (Chang and Krosnick 2002) , and the KN platform does not appear to suffer from biases created by panel attrition or other "panel effects" (Dennis and Li 2007; Hines, Douglas, and Mahmood 2010) . Second, the key policy measures reflect a single dimension of responsibility for medical care costs (i.e. "Ralph should pay all costs" versus "Citizens should pay all costs"; and "Individuals and private insurance" versus "Government insurance plan") when, in fact, the current policy environment features a more complex array of government and private programs for paying for health care costs, including government regulation and administration of insurance exchanges within the private market. In addition, recent survey methodology research suggests that framing the disparities vignettes as concerning differences between groups may have made biological/genetic attributions more likely than if the vignette had concerned attribution of characteristics to individuals (Singer et al. 2010) . Thus Experiments 1 and 2 are not directly comparable to Experiment 3, since the target of evaluation was an individual in the former and groups in the latter. Finally, the study was conducted in 2007, before the health care reform was ascendant on the policy agenda of the Obama administration. Race, class, and behavioral attributes-and deservingness considerations more generally-have likely become even more central to public considerations of who should pay for health care costs today.
What can we conclude about the politics of health policy from these findings? First, we find that both biological attributions and behavioral attributions for health inequalities are associated with weak support for a government role in provision of health insurance. This means that a reflexive attribution of disparities in health to either biological, genetic, or behavioral causes is likely to produce a politics of health that systematically devalues government action to redress those disparities. The reification of racial group differences as biological may underlie a principled opposition to sharing the burdens of health care costs within society, and/or it may reflect ignorance about the well-documented structural roots (i.e., income differences, education, the experience of discrimination) of contemporary health inequalities.
It not yet clear whether these public narratives about the causes of ill health are rigid, or whether they are malleable and might change over time (Niederdeppe et al. 2008) .
A second troubling implication springs from the very strong observed effects of the behavioral cues on both blame and policy preferences. Health behaviors like smoking, diet, and exercise are often not exclusively voluntary-especially among low-income or otherwise disadvantaged groups that face major societal barriers to pursuing a healthy lifestyle (Lantz et al. 1998; Link and Phelan 1995) . Given these obstacles to true choice, blaming people who engage in these behaviors for their ill health seems not only unjust, but also likely to undermine public support for policy designed to ensure equitable and universal access to medical care (see also Wikler 1987) . If, after all, the major burden of disease in society results from individuals' misguided or "sinful" choices (to smoke, to not exercise, to eat in excess), why should society subsidize access to health care?
Finally, a focus in health policy discourse on personal responsibility for health is likely to contribute to the social stigmatization of people engaging in those "sinful" health behaviors (Bayer and Stuber 2006; Puhl and Heuer 2009) . Alarmingly, health behavior-related stigma in turn has documented negative consequences for health (Puhl and Heuer 2010 ). Yet unhealthy behaviors like smoking, poor diet and lack of exercise, and their immediate consequences --e.g., moderate obesity --have become more stigmatized over time in part because they are increasingly associated with low status groups (Aronowitz 2008 ). In public debate, then, negative attitudes toward groups defined by health behaviors are not only socially acceptable and highly consequential for policy attitudes; they may also serve to subtly reinforce older, discredited, stereotypes about groups defined by ascriptive characteristics like race and class.
Respondents were randomized into one of the following conditions: Note: Systemic causal attribution (prejudice, health system failure, economic system failure) is the base outcome. Respondents who attributed group differences to luck (n=40) were excluded. All covariates except age scaled 0-1. 
